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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to outline how Azerbaijan should manage the numerous foreign policy challenges it faces 
due to its strategic location, wealth in resources, neighbors and surrounding conflicts. As a small state, Baku 
should seek to balance interests and pursue a path of multipolarity, without however forfeiting a strong 
stance towards governments that threaten its status quo. Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the West all have 
their interests and Azerbaijan has to become a pawn in the hands of the powerful. The resolution of the 
“frozen conflict” over Nagorno-Karabakh would mark a great step in the right direction, providing Baku 
with more leverage. The economic power of Azerbaijan gives the South Caucasian Republic a unique asset 
and allows Baku to play a balancing role regarding conflict prevention and conflict solution in this region 
which is often described as a geopolitical chessboard.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Caucasus is often described as a geopolitical chessboard, where Great Power interests clash and 
often make “bad local politics worse”. Small states traditionally have a difficult standing and face 
difficult choices. Thomas De Waal argues that one should overcome bilateralism and implement a 
“holistic regional approach” by fostering local entrepreneurship with border-crossing small traders, 
paying more attention to the people than the governments and opening borders instead of blocking 
regions.1 
 This article will deal with the current security environment of Azerbaijan, its history, outside 
actors, future challenges and provide policy guidance.  First, it will analyze Azerbaijan-Armenia 
relations and the post Soviet dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict. Second, we will 
take a closer look at Baku’s immediate strategic neighborhood, focusing on Russia, Iran and Israel. 
Third, the article will examine NATO’s role and interest, especially those of the US and Turkey.  
Washington and Ankara are important given their influence and furthermore provide an example for 
the role of Armenian pressure groups influencing NATO’s agenda. The latter is worth exploring as it 
could play a key role in linking NATO with both, Baku and Yerevan. In a final part we will argue 
that Baku needs to uphold its multilateral foreign policy and balance between numerous actors to be 
able to solve the “frozen conflicts” with neighbors and prevent new tensions from boiling over. 
                                               
1 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/13/call_off_the_great_game?page=full 
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 The Perils of “Divide & Rule” and “Glasnost” 
 
The NK situation is often described as a „frozen conflict“, nonetheless, between 1994 and 2011 
about 3,000 Azeris and Armenians have been killed in clashes along the border.2 Jale Sultanli, 
compares the situation in the Southern Caucasus Region with a „volcano which can appear quiet but 
is alive and therefore poses an imminent danger of eruption. “3 Repeatedly reciprocal accusations of 
border violations erupt and often lead to deadly clashes and the killings of soldiers. Neither side 
shies away from aggressive rhetoric and muscle flexing and is fast in blaming the other side for 
aggressive behavior.4 In March 2012 Armenia boycotted the Eurovision Song Contest in Baku.5 
Despite numerous attempts to settle their differences, e.g. by the “Minsk Group”6, the absence of 
war does not imply lasting peace. 
 Having already resorted to arms in 1905-1906 and 1918-1920, the NK conflict from 1992 to 
1994 resulted in the killing of 30,000 people, displaced approximately one million Azeris7 and can 
be classified as an „Ethnic War“.8 The turmoil, mass deportations and killings in the “mountainous 
black garden” (literal translation of Nagorno-Karabakh) from 1992-1994 can be seen as the result of 
century-old feuds between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijani.9 In addition to socio-economic, 
nationalistic and linguistic tensions, the “divide and rule” policies of Stalin in the first years of the 
Soviet Union added further fuel to entrenched animosities.10 Although they were the majority in the 
20th century, many Azerbaijanis view the Armenians as “intruders” who were encouraged by Russia 
to migrate from Iran in the course of the last 150 years, a country where 16% of the population 
consists of  Iranian Azerbaijanis.11 
  The “Glasnost” policies introduced by Gorbachev in the 1980s were the straw to break the 
camel’s back as it enabled “latent resentments and aspirations to resurface”.12 The newly found 
room to maneuver initiated a slow but steady decoupling process from the Soviet Union, which in 
turn led to the surfacing of new found nationalistic sentiments on the Armenian as well as Azeri 
                                               
2 http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/03/nagorno-karabakh_conflict 
3 http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/lingering-shadows-of-the-past 
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18328690 and recently http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19440661 
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17292360 
6 http://www.osce.org/mg/ 
7 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh-2.htm  
8 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2010_S08_hlb_ks.pdf, 18-19 
9 Croissant, M.,1998. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications,  New York: Praeger Frederick, 18-21 
10 http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/276-nagorno-karabakh-an-unacceptable-status-quo.html 
11 ; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib92109.pdf 
12 Hunter, S. 1994. The Transcaucasus in transition: nation-building and conflict, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 99 
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side, while Russia remained in the tradition of Armenia’s closest ally.13 Nationalism was the uniting 
force that replaced communism. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh War and Post-Conflict Mediation 
 
In December 1991 the Armenian majority strived towards the creation of an independent state. 
Shortly after Azerbaijan gained statehood, Armenians declared control of NK and further buffer 
zones amounting to about 20 % of Azerbaijan’s territory. With about one-eight of its population 
being forcefully displaced, Azerbaijan has one of the highest refugee numbers worldwide.14 The 
intrusion of Azerbaijani territory in 1992 by Armenian forces led to a condemnation by the UN 
Security Council, yet further territorial violations followed in 1993 and 1994 despite four UN 
resolutions condemning the violence. The UN resolutions demanded the withdrawal of all 
Armenian troops occupying foreign territory, but the lack of deadlines or sanctions turned them into 
“paper tigers.”15 Additionally, the OSCE peace plans failed to put an end to the atrocities committed 
by both sides. One of the main reasons was a dispute between Azerbaijanis and Russians regarding 
the nationality of peacekeeping troops. The Kremlin insisted on deploying own soldiers which in 
turn was regarded as unacceptable for Baku.16 Also the so-called “Madrid principles” formulated by 
the Minsk Group did not change the dynamics of the stalemate between, Armenia and Azerbaijan.17 
 
Recent public efforts which aim at diffusing the “entrenched” status quo have had some success, but 
did not however alter the nature of relations.  In 2007, Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister stated that the 
dispute over the NK region would almost certainly spark another war.18 In addition already 60 
percent of the population supported a military intervention in 2006 and constitute a domestic 
pressure to decision-makers on both sides. 19 
 The normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, the uncertainty regarding the final legal 
status of NK, as well as the fact that the Karabakh region itself is excluded from the negotiation 
process are factors that severely hinder a rapprochement.20, Both countries have official “days of 
mourning” on which the other nation is condemned and engaging in dialogues is often seen as a 
sign of weakness within the respective populations. Thus, it seems that the dispute over NK is in a 
                                               
13 http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-war-humanitarian-challenge-and-peacekeeping  
14 http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2010_S08_hlb_ks.pdf , 18-21 
15 Ibidem 
16 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh-2.htm  
17 http://www.osce.org/mg/51152  
18http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=0F87E692ABC2A8A132066779A66F0D76?n
ewsId=128129  
19Yusnov, Azerbaijan in the Early of XXI Century, p. 221. in http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2010_S08_hlb_ks.pdf 
20 http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5199  
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deadlock situation so it is vital to separate the actors’ positions from their interests when trying to 
solve a seemingly intractable dispute. The failure of the Minsk Group, the absence of a coherent EU 
policy steered towards a resolution of the conflict as well as a NATO’s unwillingness to clearly 
position itself do not really ameliorate the prospects of successful conflict resolution. The fierce 
rhetoric and border clashes aside, there are however mutual interests that, if nurtured, can provide 
the breeding ground for a rapprochement.  
 Turkey, a resurging regional giant, should take a larger role in mediating between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia. In order to make this possible, Ankara has to become an acceptable partner for 
Armenia. Mutual reconciliation even in such cases is possible as e.g. the Germans showed in regard 
to France or Israel. Azerbaijan does not fully trust the US and France, due to their strong Armenian 
lobbies. Calling Russia a neutral broker would be to dismiss historical ties with Armenia as well as 
support from Moscow during the NK conflict. The involvement of Turkey as a co-chair of the 
Minsk Group could counter-balance this asymmetry perceived by Azerbaijan. This inclusion or the 
possibility of Ankara acting as the host of a bilateral Azerbaijan-Armenia dialogue, supported by the 
Minsk Group, is a long term perspective goal. 
 In 2010 Moscow and Washington supported the resurfacing of an Armenia-Turkey dialogue 
and already one decade earlier the US State Department supported the formation of the Turkish-
Armenian Reconciliation Forum (TARC).21 However, several analysts state, that there can be no 
normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations without solving the NK conflict; also evident in the 
official Turkish position where Erdogan explicitly highlights this paradigm in speeches and 
roundtable discussions.22 We on the other hand see the viability of improving Turkey-Armenia 
relations as the precursor for NK conflict resolution. Turkey and Armenia could present and 
enhance their willingness to cooperate within the paradigm of conflict resolution of the NK conflict. 
Consequently, a positive spill-over effect is likely to happen if successful steps towards peace are 
taken. Moving beyond just another meaningless cease-fire is pivotal. 
 
“Befriend thy neighbors” 
 
In regard to its direct neighbors, Azerbaijan is attempting to pursue a path of multipolarity and 
balancing all powers in a “Small State Survival 101”. Key players remain the Caucasian neighbors, 
Russia, Israel, Iran and Turkey. All policies deal directly or indirectly with the Karabakh conflict, 
energy questions and national sovereignty. Relations are mainly motivated by economic ties and 
                                               
21 http://www.monitor.upeace.org/documents/intractability.pdf, 11-12 
22 http://www.tert.am/en/news/2010/10/11/usanalyst/  
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security needs. 
 Azerbaijan traditionally has good relations with Georgia and minor border disputes are 
outweighed by pipeline cooperation and railway projects. This is underscored by the role Baku 
played during the 2008 war, when it assisted Georgia.23 Azerbaijan was a key destination for 
Chechen refugees, who confronted Baku with economic problems and the threat of Salafi radical 
elements. Fearing instability, many were extradited to Russia. Furthermore, Azeri businessmen 
invest and trade in regions where their Russian counterparts do not have an easy standing.24 
 
The Bear stays outside 
 
As shown, Russia was the most dominant actor in the region for the most of the 20th century, and 
when Moscow’s power started fading, it tried to fractionalize the region which is seen as “new 
abroad”. The Yeltsin doctrine’s aim was to guarantee Moscow the position of the sole protector. 
Instability under Russian control is therefore the most desired outcome for the Kremlin in order to 
function as a broker. 
 Nevertheless, Baku has shown its ability to counter Muscovite initiatives via balanced 
multipolar foreign policy. For example, Azerbaijan included Western energy companies so that they 
had incentives to safeguard domestic stability and regional peace.25 In addition, the future usage of 
the Gabala radar station seems doubtful and will most likely cost the Russians much more than 
before.26 Baku also countered the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement by leaning closer towards 
Russia and fostering a new agreement over the Caspian Sea using rights. As a result, Russia has no 
power to destabilize Azerbaijan internally and the Western ties and energy policies give Baku ample 
space to maneuver. 
  The public opinion of Russia as a neutral broker and friendly state remains highly volatile 
and dropped, due to the 2008 war and support for Armenia27, from 80% in 2007 to 54% in 2009.28 
Additionally, young Azerbaijanis do not have the same ties to the Russian culture as former 
generations, even though remittances remain one important link between both societies.  
 On the other hand both countries can have common interests: by selling gas to Russia and 
other Caucasian states, Baku derives gas from the EU favored “Nabucco” pipeline which would 
question the possibility of reaching its maximum capacity. At the same time it is cheaper for Russia 
                                               
23 http://www.laender-analysen.de/cad/pdf/CaucasusAnalyticalDigest27.pdf, 4 
24 http://www.laender-analysen.de/cad/pdf/CaucasusAnalyticalDigest27.pdf, 8 
25 http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mei/mei/2009/00000063/00000002/art00004 
26 http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120302/171688248.html 
27 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/197735 
28 http://ada.edu.az/uploads/file/Neither%20Friend%20nor%20Foe.pdf 
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to have its own Caucasian regions supplied from Azerbaijan. Baku on the other hand, is able to sell 
at market price and gain influence as it "exports" energy security. 
 
The “Iceberg-relationship”
29 
 
Energy also plays a key role in the relationship with Tel Aviv, as Baku supplies 30% of Israeli oil 
imports and receives hi-tech products in exchange. What started with trade in the 1990s soon 
developed into closer intelligence sharing and Israeli delivery of security and surveillance 
systems.30 
In February 2012 an arms deal over $1.6 billion was signed that equals Baku’s 2012 defense 
budget. The UAVs and anti-missile systems were welcomed goods as the OSCE still has not lifted 
its arms embargo against Azerbaijan. The deal shows that Israel and Azerbaijan share security 
concerns, both being surrounded by not trust-worthy or hostile states. Another hot topic is the 
possible use of Azeri airfields by Israel, which aims at eliminating the “over-flight problem” in case 
of an attack on Iran.31 The possibility to use Soviet-abandoned Azeri airfields would give returning 
planes a closer home base, eliminate midflight refueling and thus providing more weaponry weight 
on board for more firepower.32 These bases could also be used to station search-and-rescue teams. 
However, both states deny such a deal and the Azeri ambassador to the US was quick to call this 
report only “interesting fiction but far from the truth”.33 Indeed, Azerbaijan could be the first victim 
of retaliation in case of an Israeli attack on Iran, if it turned out true that “the Israelis have bought an 
airfield and the airfield is called Azerbaijan”.34 
 
The Islamist neighbor 
 
 One main dispute with Iran is related to the large group of ethnic Azeris in Iran, which makes up 
around 20% of the Iranian population. Irredentism and proposals to name Azerbaijan “Northern 
Azerbaijan” led to accusations by Teheran of creating domestic unrest. The Iranian strive to become 
a regional power in the Caucasus35, e.g. by supplying Armenia with energy, also clashes with 
Baku’s interests.  
                                               
29 http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2618 
30 http://www.meforum.org/987/israel-and-azerbaijans-furtive-embrace 
31http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israel_s_secret_staging_ground?page=full 
32 http://www.foi.se/FOI/Templates/NewsPage____9027.aspx 
33 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/azerbaijan_is_not_israels_secret_staging_ground 
34 Quoting a senior US official, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israel_s_secret_staging_ground?page=full 
35 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/20/irans_near_abroad?page=full 
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 Moreover, reports on outside influence and spying activities create tensions, as well as 
disputes over oil in the Caspian Sea and a continued propaganda war of a secular state against a 
religious one. Additionally, there were reports of failed plots to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to 
Baku, hacker attacks on Azerbaijani TV stations, killed journalists, border guard clashes, air space 
violations as well as government initiated protests against the Eurovision Song Contest.36 
 After the Israeli-Azeri arms deals was announced publicly the relations further deteriorated 
as Iran shut its border stations. Ambassadors were called home and a media war continues to rage 
on a daily basis. Today, Iranian TV stations are reported to attract more and more rural Azeris that 
do not benefit from the economic progress so far 37, hence the possibility of influencing domestic 
groups is not a one-way option. 
 
What can NATO do to reduce tensions? 
 
A problem that occurs when trying to explore the Alliance’ s position is that collective statements 
are usually rather blurry and leave generous gaps for interpretation. Due to their different views, the 
member states seem to try to prevent a firm positioning by all means. Thus far, a military 
intervention in NK has not been on the table and the alliance does everything it can to avoid strong 
involvement in the NK conflict. 
 NATO and Baku have just signed the third Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 
which the alliance and Azerbaijan set an agenda for the following two years. The balancing act for 
NATO lies in maintaining quasi neutrality vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Armenia without abandoning 
this strategically located region, creating a power vacuum that can be filled by proxies and turmoil.  
 Azerbaijan’s accession to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) just a couple of months ago 
could be interpreted as turning one’s back on NATO,38 as the leaders as well as the population of 
Azerbaijan seem to be dissatisfied with NATO’s diplomatic efforts. After all, however, this behavior 
should be seen as an example that goes in line with Baku’s determination to uphold its multilateral 
foreign policy. This stance sends a signal towards NATO, showing that Baku is capable of leaning 
towards non-Atlantic positions, if NATO does not act according to Azerbaijan’s interests.  
Up until now, Azerbaijan has been a Troop Contributing Nation to ISAF’s Mission in 
Afghanistan, currently stationing 94 personnel in the Hindu Kush region. Baku has also supported 
                                               
36 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/05/25/iran-azerbaijan-how-a-close-relationship-disintegrated/0/ 
37 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/middleeast/iran-and-azerbaijan-wary-neighbors-find-less-to-agree-
on.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 
38 http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_cooperation_nato/24448824.html 
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the NATO-led KFOR mission in Kosovo39. Yet, it is doubtful that a fourth IPAP will implement 
satisfactory results for Azerbaijan and the chances for a Membership Action Plan, paving the path 
for full membership, are close to zero. The reason behind this lies in some member’s anxieties, 
mainly the former Warsaw Pact states, of doing anything that might increase tensions with Russia, 
especially enlarging NATO across the former Soviet sphere. Germany also has no interest in 
disrupting the relations with Russia that have shown rising tensions during the past years under the 
Merkel administration. The case of Georgia in 2008 illustrates the anxieties and appeasement, as 
Berlin was by far not the first to condemn the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops. 
 
NATO and the European Union 
 
The big European NATO states try to avoid formulating a clear position by referring to the 
frameworks of co-operation they set through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).  Since the 
enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the interest and desire for EU presence in the region 
has grown significantly. A first EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan was negotiated and signed and finally 
came into force in 2006. The action plan states that the ENP’s scope of co-operation is divided into 
ten Priority areas, the first one being the broad goal of peaceful settlement over the NK conflict. 
However, the EU pursues the same strategy as the members’ foreign ministries by referring to yet 
another institution.40 Pointing fingers towards the OSCE seems to be a popular move by western 
actors.41 For a fruitful contribution to the Minsk-Group’s talks, European politicians usually offer 
the prospect of increased economic co-operation as incentives towards Armenia. However, 
Germany alone is already Armenia’s second largest donor behind the United States.42  
 Is the EU being a passive, comfortable bystander that enjoys keeping all options on the 
table? It does go a bit deeper than that. Even though the EU has a strong voice, it is often heard 
through other groups or institutions, in this case the OSCE. The EU approach towards the NK 
conflict in particular and multilateralism in general is characterized by supporting existing 
international frameworks instead of proactively creating a strong position through e.g. the European 
Council.  In detail, as France is a co-chair of the Minsk Group, creating a quasi oligarchy with the 
US and Russia leading negotiations, the role of the EU in actively promoting a solution of the NK 
conflict should not be overestimated. As the EU does clearly not desire military involvement, it 
should attempt to leverage its considerable soft power resources. Bearing these resources, 
                                               
39 http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf 
40 http://www.osce.org/mg/51152 
41 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/Armenien/111028_BMtrifft_Nalbandian_node.html 
42 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/BM-Reisen/2012/03-AZE-GEO-ARM/120316-Armenien-node.html 
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underlined by its status as a civilian power that promotes certain values, the chances for a peaceful 
solution through active support of the EU could be higher than solely through NATO, which is 
merely a collective security organization. Either way, the EU should in any case formulate a grand 
strategy that defines the Union’s preferred outcomes rather than letting France, which occasionally 
appears to be biased due to its large Armenian Diaspora at home, design the strategy all on its own..  
 
 
The United States 
 
Next to being the largest donor to Armenia, the United States’ position is also heavily influenced by 
a strong Armenian pressure group.43 Until August 30, 2012 the US did not even have an ambassador 
to Azerbaijan after the formerly appointed Matthew J. Bryza left office at the end of last year and 
Chargé d'Affaires Adam Sterling was appointed Deputy Chief of Mission to Azerbaijan for the 
meantime.44 Ambassador Bryza had a temporary recess appointment that could not be renewed due 
to Armenian pressure group’s opposition in congress 45. A delegation of the state department 
recently traveled to Baku in order to discuss political-military issues in a security dialog. It goes 
without saying that relations seemed to be tense for some time. However, though, considering that 
Richard Morningstar, a Caucasus expert and former Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy 
Diplomacy has just been appointed as the new ambassador as well as the increasing relevance of 
energy security, we are probably witnessing the resurrection of Azeri-US diplomacy. In addition 
Washington seems to be interested in giving further advice and deepen co-operation in the fields of 
maritime-security in the resource rich Caspian Sea to counter-balance Russian and Iranian 
influence. Further fields of cooperation include counter-terrorism in Azerbaijan as well as 
enhancing the progress in NATO-interoperability.46  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
43 http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=1394 
44 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm#relations 
45 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/middleeast/iran-and-azerbaijan-wary-neighbors-find-less-to-agree-
on.html?pagewanted=all 
46 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-522.pdf, pp.21-25 
www.cesd.az 
 
 12
So, what should NATO do? 
 
NATO obviously has no direct involvement in negotiations over the Azeri-Armenian conflict itself; 
however, NATO can still use some of its assets to decrease the slight tensions that arose lately. 
Whereas IPAPs usually just lay the foundation for short-term goals47 and with a MAP being out of 
sight, the usual measures must be changed in order to set and reach long-term prospects. In order to 
strengthen the ties again a plain all-NATO strategy might not be sufficient. It is important that a 
smart power48 strategy would be neatly aligned with its member states, especially the big European 
states. Now, this might sound untraditional but again, it would increase the ties between the 
membership countries and the Azeri government and therefore might be beneficial for speeding up a 
solution of the conflict. 
 Measures could be increased in the field of energy and other economic co-operation (soft) 
with the member states and, of course, through military co-operation (hard) by the Alliance itself. 
The advantage could be long-term prospects and in army cooperation training missions and 
schooling assistance, bear the possibility to push for more democratic control of the defense forces. 
Ensuring democratic control might be tough to achieve but was obviously one of NATO’s major 
concerns during the past years and will not be thrown overboard. Increasing co-operation is 
important as cutting it down could indispensably empower Baku to push for a military solution over 
the Karabakh case. If both, the EU and NATO, were willing to formulate a firm position the best 
way would to work together and align their strategies. Thus, a commitment of co-operation between 
all NATO states as well as the EU might be the solution that bears the best prospects for a peaceful 
solution of the NK case.  
 
  
 
 
 
                                               
47http://www.aznatomission.be/files/uploader/(2)%20Brochure%20on%20Azerbaijan-NATO%20Cooperation.pdf, 27 
48 Joseph Nye defines Smart Power = Soft Power + Hard Power, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3sLkLbmsuU 
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Conclusion  
 
Assessing Baku’s foreign relations shows the multiple problems the country faces in keeping an 
independent profile. Given its size and position several key players have to be balanced and kept in 
check. Azerbaijan is doing extremely well in keeping Russian influence at a minimum and 
balancing all great power interests while developing the economy. Baku should pursue the same 
policy here as it did so successfully with Moscow: economic ties, diplomatic offensives and 
defensives as well as providing a feeling of security on both sides. The partnership with Israel is 
another example of Baku’s successful multilateralism to balance great(er) powers and use its 
advantages to increase security and stability. Consequently, balancing the relations to the Kremlin 
remains a “necessary evil” and the unsolved NK conflict, where Baku seeks Moscow’s support, 
remains the only hurdle hindering a completely independent foreign policy.49 
 Regarding the Minsk group and the resolution of the NK conflict we have to adhere to its 
failure, as described above. Two possible scenarios could change this dynamic. The first option 
would be to strengthen the role of Turkey within the Minsk group to counter perceptions of an 
Armenian Friendly Troika represented by France, USA and Russia. Turkey, as a regional key power 
and NATO member could be a useful partner to provide Azerbaijan with the necessary support. The 
second option would be to go one step further and question the format of the Minsk group as a 
whole. Option one only seems realistic if the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is strengthened on all 
levels.  
 The only bleeding wound in this concept remains Armenia and increasingly the growing 
tensions with Iran, especially the stance of the Azeri minority. Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the 
EU have clear incentives to end the NK stalemate, to safeguard the energy export via Armenia, as it 
is the only safe transit hub for delivering Central Asian and Azeri gas to the EU with its ever rising 
energy demand and increasing dependency on Russia. Enhanced co-operation with NATO could be 
useful as Baku could leverage them as a gateway to the West and deter Tehran and Moscow 
strategically. This will be beneficial for future energy and economic co-operation and will in turn 
give Baku the advantage to lobby for more support in the NK conflict. 
 The US also has a high interest in strengthening the “Armenian Option” since it would allow 
circumventing and weakening Iran and Russia. For Azerbaijan it bears yet another advantage 
besides the prospect of turning the traditional pro-Armenian standpoint in Washington into a more 
                                               
49 http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_112.pdf 
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Baku friendly stance. The restrictions of arms trades to Azerbaijan may eventually be revisited if a 
more stable trust relationship emerges. With these prospects in sight, it would be in Baku’s interest 
to push for enhanced co-operation with NATO and especially the US.  
 Armenia has a crumbling, eroding economy and could benefit from re-opening its borders, 
becoming a focal point for energy trade and export. Azerbaijan has a booming economy and would 
be able to deliver gas directly to the EU and its neighbors without having to deal with Iran and 
Russia. Broken down to the dimension of economics, solving the NK conflict seems to be a win-
win situation for both conflicting parties. Consequently, “it’s the economy”, that should be the 
driving motor for resolution, enabling opportunities for peace and prosperity, especially by 
engaging in closer energy cooperation.  . 
 Baku will only be able to successfully promote its multipolar approach if it maintains its 
delicate balancing act between several powers; each displaying interests of their own. Becoming too 
dependent on certain actors could have severe negative impacts on Azerbaijan’s position in the 
region. Starting efforts in the field of economics can lead to a reduction of ideological and 
passionate aspects of the conflict. At the same time Baku must also develop a clear roadmap which 
enables the country to effectively combine domestic needs and international aspirations in order to 
secure its position in the South Caucasus and prevent new tensions from arising. 
